THE New Republic

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FACULTIES HAVE TOO MUCH POWER

Sun-Ripened Reflections of Reed Whittemore

JANUARY 6, 1958

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Washington Wire

Bringers of Bad Tidings

THE MOST DISTURBED group in the country today are the Wall Street Internationalists. They are the ones who sold us a well Eisenhower in 1952 and a sick Eisenhower in 1956. They pull the strings which control newspapers, banks, chambers of commerce. They are well-meaning men and enlightened according to their limitations. Every four years they become interested in politics but lose interest between times. Taft's isolationism frightened them and they swung to Eisenhower, as they had before to Dewey and Willkie.

Now, in horror, they see what they have done. The nation is in danger, there is a cipher in the White House, and their conscience tells them they are responsible. I use the phrase "Wall Street Internationalists," but that is not really accurate. Henry Luce does not operate in Wall Street. Charlie Wilson does not operate in Wall Street. I am speaking of the informed, multi-millioned power elite all over the country that makes the Republican Party its chosen vehicle, knows the world is round, and thinks politics something it can dabble in.

That is really why the alarmist news of the so-called Gaither Report is leaking out all over Washington. This is the report which Jim Hagerty declares does not say that the USA is weak in relation to Russia *"at this time."* The Gaither Report has not been published and almost certainly won't be. If published it would expose the inexcusable complacency of the Administration. But who prepared the report? Why, good, sound millionaire Republicans for the most part. They are part and parcel of the Wall Street Internationalists who gave us Eisenhower. They made a serious study of Russia and America and were scared by what they discovered. They were even more scared when they gave the report to the National Security Council and heard Eisenhower's inadequate reaction. Now they want the report put out and the calculated leaks are coming from them.

Amiable White House Secretary Jim Hagerty has a penchant for night life on foreign assignments. At his best he is a superb public relations technician, but he was hardly himself in the ridiculous episode at Paris when he tangled with the *New York Herald-Tribune* humorist Art Buchwald. He interpreted as a deadly insult what anybody else could see was a mild spoof. American correspondents find it difficult to believe, in spite of Hagerty's denial, that Eisenhower did not himself prompt Hagerty to his otherwise inexplicable rage.

The President Listens

ONE OF THE SADDEST sights Americans have ever seen was the well-loved Eisenhower sitting by last week in the post-NATO televised report to the nation while Dulles meandered through 24 of the 30 minutes performance. You could not follow what was said because the situation spoke so much louder. Here was the President of the United States, looking bored and self-conscious, cast in a subordinate role to an underling. He listened; Dulles talked.

Eisenhower has had no press conference since October 30. The American government is built on the Presidential principle: we put all our eggs in one basket. But in our present fix the President has offered no great program, no new ideas, no rallying point. He will be in office another three years.

Whence will leadership come? Congress? We should like to be optimistic for a change (honestly, friends, this gloom gets us down, too), but in all candor the prospect is none too good. The House is a great unwieldy folkmoot; the Senate is not equipped to carry on coordinated executive planning. In periods of Congressional domination (like the present) there is normally an interval of partisanship and stagnation.

We ran across this quotation the other day: "The most dangerous thing about the Eisenhower influence, we believe, is the theory that because he is a General this much-divided man will not let our defense decay. . . . " Yes, it was in this column, September 16. The first Sputnik—October 4.

The rumor that the new car models aren't going very well is now confirmed. Economists had looked to Detroit to pull us out of the present recession. But Detroit boosted the prices of new cars about $100 each. Walter Reuther suggested that, instead of raising, it lower car prices $100 and promised to take the price cut into consideration in wage negotiations. Detroit snooted Reuther. Now the recession deepens. We are in a production race with Russia, but our steel mills are operating at only about two-thirds capacity. (How preposterous can we get!) Year-end business seers predict recovery about "mid-1958" (the orthodox time-limit for this kind of prophecy). Well, we can offer a cheery note here. We honestly don't think the current downturn will last very long. As Harvard's Sumner Slichter says, there hasn't been a recession in history that could be halted so easily. Even a headless Administration can't stand by and see a recession grow.

Three-Headed Eagle

ACTUALLY THE ADMINISTRATION isn't headless. The American eagle now has *three* heads. There is Eisenhower, Sherman Adams, and Nixon. Eisenhower is head of state but no longer head of government. Adams wasn't elected but has the power. Nixon has only limited power but was elected.

Adams is not accountable to the voters, not accountable to Congress and his influence is unique in history. He is, alas, a limited man. He sneered at Adlai Stevenson when Dulles made a gesture of bipartisanship before NATO; he termed Sputnik nothing more than a "basketball"; he fought to keep defense spending down in 1957 to allow a political tax cut this year.

There is a widespread belief that Nixon has more power than he has. But Nixon has few real executive responsibilities. Aside from attendance at weekly cabinet and National Security Council meetings he sees the President only perhaps once a month; Adams is in and out of Eisenhower's office all day. Nixon's mental equipment is remarkable. Whether he has any convictions nobody knows.

T.R.B.

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The New Republic

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Correspondence

► *Federal Aid to Education*

SIRS:

I READ with interest the editorial on education in the November 25 issue of *The New Republic*. I appreciate the kind comments about my talk on education and I welcome the appeal for much greater attention and support generally for education. I like the editorial, even

(Continued on page 23)

Kennan's Advice

IT HAS BEEN rightly observed that Mr. George Kennan, along with Mr. Bulganin, was an unseen guest at the Paris conference of the heads of governments of NATO. Almost all the European leaders present were troubled, as Mr. Kennan is troubled and as we have been troubled, by a sense that the new military efforts now demanded would not in the long run be accepted by their people unless accompanied by a policy which looked beyond the arms race and offered at least a chance of something more hopeful.

It was just this feeling that it is not enough to keep reacting to any Soviet technical achievement by new armaments without knowing where we ourselves wish to get by them, which had given to Kennan's BBC lectures their extraordinary impact in Western Europe, and caused the Norwegian Premier Einar Gerhardsen explicitly to refer to them at the conference. Mr. Gerhardsen was in 1949 the first Scandinavian leader to plunge with determination for the NATO alliance; and despite some silly reports cabled from Paris, he is today as aware of the Soviet danger and as far from any "neutralist" or "appeasing" mood as he was then. The ideas of Kennan have impressed him, and many other responsible supporters of NATO in Europe, precisely because they were not advanced as an alarmist call for "summit" talks tomorrow, but in the sober and thoughtful tones of the man who first put forward the policy of containment.

Two of Mr. Kennan's ideas, above all, seem to us worthy of urgent discussion. One is his emphasis on the concept of military "disengagement" in Central Europe as the only way to reduce the risk of war and to extend the area of human freedom. The other is his view of the possibility of setting unilateral limits to the arms race. To our way of thinking, the first of these seems far sounder, and far more carefully thought out.

Europe is today the only part of the world where the West is potentially on the political offensive against Soviet Communism, whose extreme brittleness in Eastern Europe was strikingly proved by the events of just over a year ago in Hungary and Poland. It is also, with the Middle East, the area where the risk of local explosions leading to international war is greatest, precisely because of the instability of the Communist regimes. (One has only to imagine the suppression of another East German rising while West German forces stand at the frontier.) The ending of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, which would inevitably lead to at least the modification and perhaps the overthrow of the Soviet-imposed regimes there, is thus not only an urgent interest of the West for moral reasons, but an urgent need in the interest of peace; and as a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe cannot be achieved by force or the threat of force, it can only be negotiated against a corresponding Anglo-American withdrawal from Western Germany and some of the neighboring countries.

That, in a nutshell, is the case for "disengagement." It presupposes that the countries from which the Powers withdraw, including a future united

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Germany, are obliged by international treaty to remain neutral in the military sense, are permanently limited to non-atomic arms, and are guaranteed by both sides against renewed forcible intervention by either. It also presupposes that they remain free to choose their own internal regime and to enter non-military arrangements with other states—such as the European Common Market; and that their unsettled frontier problems—particularly the German-Polish frontier—are settled by treaty at the same time. The result would be a militarily neutral but politically free belt across Europe, guaranteed by both power groups, instead of the present military frontier on the Elbe.

Ever since the Hungarian revolution, *The New Republic* has advocated that the West aim at a European settlement on these lines. We candidly admit that this policy poses some serious objections which must be answered. One is that, militarily speaking, NATO would lose more in German forces and forward bases than Russia would lose in her unwilling satellites. The answer here is that nobody seriously wants to put intermediate ballistic missiles into Western Germany anyhow, that there will be enough room for them left within shooting distance of Russia, and that the loss of bases will be similar for both sides; as for the German conventional forces, they would have the same delaying effect on a Soviet land attack whether inside or outside NATO—enough to give the alarm and to bring into play under the guarantee, the threat of Allied nuclear retaliation against the aggressor.

Another objection to the disengagement idea is that a powerful country like Germany could not be kept neutral or limited in her armaments by treaty. Here the answer is, first, that a majority of Germans may willingly accept these limitations as the price of recovering national unity in freedom; second, that violation of the neutrality pact would be shunned by both Eastern and Western potential partners because of the risk of war; and third, that a ban on nuclear weapons may have to be imposed on many more medium and small powers by agreement among the great ones if the risk of blowing up our planet by accident is to be kept reasonably small.

☆

Finally, it is argued that Russia, despite Mr. Khrushchev's unofficial hints at agreement with the disengagement concept, cannot accept a European settlement which would endanger all the postwar Communist regimes and thus deprive the Soviet Union of the political fruits of World War II. The same Mr. Khrushchev has indeed lately insisted on Western recognition of the "status quo" of Communist conquests. But the question is not simply what the *Soviet* leaders would *like* to get, but what *we* can get them to *accept* as lesser evils by an active negotiating policy. Their manpower problem and the latent unrest in the satellites make a withdrawal desirable for them; they may find it even more desirable as the risk grows that otherwise nuclear stockpiles and IRBM launching sites may be placed into Western Germany. They have already officially suggested that these be banned in both Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia (which would reduce Soviet costs and risks but leave them in possession); they might be willing to go further.

It is, of course, true that the bargaining position of Washington—and to a very considerable extent that means the West—was stronger last winter than it is now; it is unfortunate that these proposals were not advanced then; but they were not, and now we are committed to try some new approach to negotiations after the failure of last summer's disarmament talks. It must be an approach that is based neither on naïve trust in Russian "good intentions" nor on the mere desire to make a perfunctory gesture of goodwill, but on a sober calculation of mutual self-interest.

☆

It will take time to work on this new approach, assuming there is enough wit in Washington at present (there is some question about that) to see that a new approach is needed; certainly there is no point in rushing once more to the "summit" with nothing new to say, and no advance intimation that the Soviets are honestly interested in whatever new we do have to say. We cannot overemphasize that the Russians do not need to meet Mr. Eisenhower at the summit in order to communicate. There is an American Ambassador in Moscow and a Soviet Ambassador in Washington. Moreover, the convincing evidence of a Soviet desire to negotiate (rather than propagandize) is Moscow's willingness to talk privately. But the time that is needed to work out a new approach with our allies can and must be used also to restore NATO's military organization: nobody can safely negotiate with the USSR from a seriously disadvantageous military position, and that is our position now.

This brings us to Mr. Kennan's military views. He has suggested, briefly, that the deterrent as now possessed by both the Super-Powers is enough for total destruction of the enemy, and that further multiplication of the risks and costs by every new innovation in that field is thus useless. He has argued that since Russia is using her strength in the political-military context of subversion and threats, the appropriate response is to ensure social stability in the threatened areas and defend them by a kind of home-guard or militia, just making sure that the Soviets will be deterred by the impossibility of finding collaborators.

This seems to us clearly a half-baked idea. The Soviets were not deterred by lack of collaborators in Hungary; nor were the Nazis in Norway. It is improbable that the Russians, in bullying a neighboring country, will risk open aggression—particularly if the country concerned is guaranteed by a nuclear power. But for the guarantee to be effective, it must be impossible for the Russians to

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overrun the country *without* real war; in other words, the nation to be guaranteed must have conventional forces of sufficient strength to fight seriously in defense of its frontiers—not just a militia guarding the crossroads.

As for the deterrent, it need not be multiplied, but it must remain effective. If anti-aircraft defenses vastly improve in the next few years, we shall be dependent for our capacity to respond to Soviet aggression on missiles—and this is even truer if disengagement brings the main centers of the USSR out of range of low-flying bombers. As Russia's coastline contains far less of her vital centers than does ours, some of our missiles will have to be land-based; and so long as we have not enough reliable missiles of intercontinental range, we shall need overseas bases for those of intermediate range. Kennan may be right in warning against following up the folly of technically slipping behind by the opposite folly of trying to outdo the Russians in every conceivable field at once. But if he really thinks we could stop the arms race unilaterally, he is wrong. We need not be able to boast that the first rocket to the moon was Made in the USA, or that we can inflict X times as much destruction on the Russians as they can inflict on us. But we must be sure, and must keep the Russians convinced, that whatever they do to us, we can still damage them heavily. Only thus can we rely on their self-interest to prevent them from risking all-out war; only so long will our guarantee to anybody make sense; only on that basis can we negotiate settlements that will further reduce the risk. To repeat: *the effort to keep up our armaments and the development of a policy for negotiation are not mutually exclusive alternatives; they are complements, each indispensable to ensure the other's success.*

The New Republic has been asking for a new spirit of urgency and initiative in Washington—a step-up in military production and research, a sharing of technical discoveries with NATO partners, and the arming of consenting European allies with intermediate missiles. This is not a program one can advocate with any joy. The alternative, the Russians should clearly understand, is East-West agreement for Soviet evacuation of all Central Europe—not only Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In turn, our government must be prepared to accept the withdrawal of American forces from the continent of Europe.

British Parties Divide on Talks with Russia

FOR THE FIRST TIME since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the British parties are divided on the fundamental character of Western policy towards the Soviet Union. The Labour Party's vote on December 20 was intended as an act of censure, not only against the Conservative Government's handling of foreign policy, but also against the general posture assumed at Paris by NATO as a whole.

That debate in Parliament was notable for a brilliant debut by Aneurin Bevan as Labour Party spokesman on NATO affairs—his previous speeches as Shadow Foreign Secretary have been largely concerned with the Middle East. "I want to make it quite clear," he said,

> . . . that we are not in favor of disbanding the NATO alliance. We never have been. What we are saying is that we do not consider that Her Majesty's Government is exerting the right influence within that alliance. We believe that there are people all over the world, and particularly in the United States, who would prefer that Great Britain should take a stronger and more independent line in foreign affairs. We believe that American official opinion lags far behind the readiness of the American people themselves. We are profoundly depressed when representative after representative of the Government gets up and repeats over and over again this liturgy of hate, injecting into the international situation no element of buoyancy or optimism at all, having no advice to give to the nation except to pile up one more tier of ridiculous armaments on the useless pile already created.

It should be emphasized that the Labour Party attacked the Paris Conference not because it opposes membership in the alliance, but on the contrary, because it believes, like Lester Pearson, the ex-Foreign Minister of Canada, that unless NATO drastically modifies the rigid pharisaism of its present political posture, it will not only throw the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa into the arms of Russia, but also disintegrate at its very core in Europe.

Unfortunately, there is still little sign that Macmillan or Dulles have drawn the right lesson from their experience in Paris. Macmillan has expressed his willingness for new talks with the Russians, but as a move of psychological warfare, in which the West will restate positions it knows to be unacceptable to the Russians, believing that their rejection will in itself restore unity and confidence to the alliance. There could be no more fatal mistake. If talks are held with the Russians at which the West fails to produce new proposals which are obviously intended as a basis for serious negotiations, public opinion will become so disgusted with the rigidity of its leaders that it may well swing dangerously far toward acceptance of any offer the Russians make.

DENIS HEALEY

London

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The "Socialism" of Non-Socialists in Asia

WITH due respect for *The New Republic's* persistent (but lonely) criticism of the dogmas that dog the new Development Loan Fund, there still prevails an indistinct appreciation of the nature and genesis of what are termed socialist enterprises in Asian underdeveloped countries. I have the impression that many Americans believe that the seeming popularity of socialist forms of ownership in this region stems from ideological attachments, that Asian countries could well achieve their ends through economic devices resembling those with which America is familiar, and that therefore the Administration may be justified in withholding economic assistance from non-private enterprises.

I do not wish to say that socialism as an ideology has no adherents in the ranks of governments in Asian countries: it has in many countries. I do contend that the economic circumstances of these countries have compelled, and will continue to compel, even Ministers who are ideologically opposed to socialism to go in for socialist or state-owned enterprise.

Ceylon, the country I know best, is a good case-study. In Ceylon, the railways, the telephone and telegraph services, and the electric power generation and supply system are state-owned and state-controlled. To many Americans, this savors of socialism. The significant thing is that these services were started as state undertakings by no other agency than the British imperial government when Ceylon was still a colony! Since Ceylon became an independent country, these services have continued to operate under Government ownership and control. Other state-owned enterprises have also been started, most of them in the industrial as against the public utility field. There are state-owned factories for producing cement, chinaware, leather goods and plywood.

These post-independence industrial projects were launched under the regime of the United National Party in Ceylon. This party did at one time try to sport a socialist label, but no one took that seriously; it was and continues to be the most right-wing political group in Ceylon. Its leadership comes from the bourgeoisie: land and plantation owners, mine owners, omnibus service tycoons and other wealthy business and professional men. Socialism had no fascination for them. The party's leaders, like the late D. S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala, were among the stoutest opponents of Marxism in Asia; they were also the staunchest supporters of the West.

It is not difficult to understand the paradox of a capitalist government sponsoring socialist enterprises. Any government in a backward country in Asia, whatever its ideology, has to realize that the state today is forced to play a much larger role in the economic field than is consistent with the classical principles of capitalism. It has to, or be kicked out of office.

The conditions which compel this are the low savings among the people, inadequate financial institutions, the timidity and lack of experience of the few native capitalists and the lack of industrial techniques and knowledge. The few people who are able to save money keep to known enterprises such as plantations; they find that the safest course is to buy an already developed plantation from a Britisher. They are intimidated by their lack of experience in the industrial field and by the difficulty of securing necessary technical skills which would be new to the country.

The state finds that even the people who can save some money require a lot of persuasion and encouragement to venture into needed but novel industries. For the most part, the state finds that it is the only agency which can raise sufficient financing, both locally and from outside, and is also the agency in the best position to secure the required technical skills, through international agencies and from friendly foreign nations.

The local entrepreneur would have been more enterprising, perhaps, if he had local examples to follow and learn from, but when the British left Ceylon (and other Asian colonies) they did not leave behind many industries. The imperial country was only interested in a few specific extractive industries outside of the plantation economy. The only other services they left were what had been indispensable for the success of the main enterprises: for instance, a good administration and communications system.

THIS FAILURE to promote other industries is insufficiently realized. When the British left Ceylon, virtually every ounce of rubber grown in the country was exported in the raw form. Every year, however, Ceylon imported manufactured rubber products, including the most simple ones, from the West, chiefly from Britain. The colonies were used to produce the raw material and to market the manufactured article, but the manufacturing and processing took place in the home country, not in the colony from which the raw material came. This happened despite the oft-mentioned availability of cheap labor. It is in these circumstances that a right-wing political party, the UNP in Ceylon, felt compelled to adopt socialist solutions when faced with the problem of economic development. Ideology was irrelevant.

C. A. GUNAWARDENE

MR. GUNAWARDENE, *a Ceylon newspaperman currently in the US on a fellowship from the International Press Institute, has served as Ceylonese correspondent for the* Christian Science Monitor *and the* London Economist.

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Adenauer Bides His Time

IT IS REPORTED that Dr. Adenauer retired to bed when he returned from the NATO conference, for his limbs were tired after two jolting train journeys to and from Paris. By rights, he ought also to have returned a worried man, for the line-up against acceptance of nuclear weapons and medium-range rockets by Western Germany is a strong one. It includes the Social Democratic and Free Democratic parties, the trade unions, the Evangelical Churches, the vocal group of Goettingen scientists, the Heidelberg University professors and many other academicians, and a number of youth organizations. According to the figures of one Gallup Poll survey, it includes about three-quarters of the people of Western Germany.

Yet, the Chancellor shows no signs of yielding. He believes that NATO must be made militarily fully effective, as well as politically coordinated. If he is now keeping quiet, it is because the question of nuclear arms and rockets is not "actual." Nor can it be settled without due reference to the Bundestag. Anyway, the Federal Republic still has the legal right to renounce use of such weapons or their stock-piling on German soil. A few years ago a clear majority of the German people was opposed to German rearmament. Today only about one-quarter as many people hold that view. The same transition from agitated fear to apathetic acceptance could well occur on the question of nuclear weapons. That is certainly the Chancellor's hope.

In spite of apparent differences in Paris, Dr. Adenauer in reality never moved far from Secretary Dulles' side. His expressed readiness to treat the latest Bulganin letter seriously was a concession to German public opinion, and not a switch of policy. He will choose his moment to secure Bundestag approval for the introduction of nuclear and rocket weapons, but he is in no hurry. For the weapons are not even available at the moment, and there is still the chance—although a very remote one—of a real change of political climate in Moscow. There is also a chance—less remote—that the 82-year Chancellor will not long be allowed to choose his moments. What happens at that point to whatever NATO solidarity remains is a question which all the NATO statesmen, including Mr. Dulles, would be wise to ponder deeply.

As the Babies Grow Up

OVER THE past few years, planning of all sorts has taken for granted an annual expansion in the size of the American economy. In the field of manpower, concern has concentrated on provision of an adequate increase in the number of places in schools, and particularly in colleges and centers of advanced study, to allow a growing generation to be educated to the limit of its ability. Full employment and the resulting tight labor market have made it relatively unnecessary to wonder how the school-leaving young people who do not go to higher training will find jobs.

The amount of concern now visible may be adequate to take account of increases in the number of 18-year-olds such as are foreseen for the years until the end of 1960—an addition of some 100,000 a year is the standard pattern. But come 1961, a sudden peak looms up—the children of the early marriages at the outbreak of World War II. That year, the increase in 18-year-olds will treble—to an addition of 350,000 and a total of 2,924,000 youngsters turning 18. Whether at work or at study, places will suddenly become much harder to find.

Yet the year 1961 will be only a practice run on the handling of the problem that will be before the country when the first wave of postwar babies reaches 18 in 1965. Then, the number of 18-year-olds will skyrocket by more than a million in 12 months—altogether, 3,822,000 of them. And at the same time, the wave of 1961 will have moved on: the number of 22-year-olds will total 2,939,000. Among these will be the close onto half a million who will have just finished college and be entering the labor market for their first jobs. That autumn, the impact on the country's educational institutions and on the labor market will be of a size not previously experienced and not currently planned for.

Time and Money

"ONE THING that money cannot buy is time," President Eisenhower reminded us in his first "chins up" speech at Oklahoma City. "It takes time for a tree to grow, for an idea to become an accomplishment, for a student to become a scientist." And obviously it will take all the time we have left to prepare for the flood of "war babies" which will wash over our schools in 1961 (see above).

But one thing time can't buy is money. And to build new schools in adequate numbers and to strengthen science education to compete successfully with the Soviets would cost in the neighborhood of $5 billion over a 4-year period. The money is not going to be spent, if the President has his way. For to make a $1 billion beginning on such a program this year while adding $2 to $3 billion to missile production would practically end chances of balancing the budget. And thou shalt have no other gods before that budget.

With 33.6 million children in public elementary and secondary schools, the classroom shortage is already 189,000. By 1965 when 40.2 million will be in public schools, the classroom shortage will obviously make decent instruction almost impossible. But because more must be spent for defense, Administration spokesmen

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now say that school building is in a "desirable but postponable" category.

On the smaller, more limited need of training more and better scientists, however, the Administration is ready to go to work. Gifted high-school students will be sought out earlier by aptitude tests, encouraged to prepare for science and given scholarships where needed to go on to college. (Preference would go to those well prepared in science and mathematics, but others could qualify.) Science teaching will be improved by federal grants to states to raise salaries, buy equipment, grant fellowships to graduate students who wish to become teachers, and by expanding the National Science Foundation's present program to improve teaching techniques.

It is unfortunate that the funds requested for both the teacher and student programs, which are well conceived, have been held down to an arbitrary figure which Education Secretary Marion Folsom calculated was the highest he could get past the watchdogs in the Budget Bureau. The inadequacy of the amounts to be requested are sure to be pointed out in Congress, where 40 or more bills, more generous than the Administration proposes to go on federal aid to education, will be before the House and Senate committees when they convene. Senators sponsoring such bills are holding advance-of-session conferences to seek agreement on a common position. In the House pro-federal-aid Representatives, dismayed by the death of their leader, former Labor and Public Welfare Committee chairman Augustine Kelley, last month, have pulled themselves together and believe they will have a majority on the committee to outvote the antagonistic new chairman, Graham Barden of North Carolina.

The National Education Association, with 703,000 members throughout the country, is preparing to make its sentiments known to Congress. It wants a clear-cut test on federal responsibility for continuing aid to education. It regrets the idea of federal favoritism to science students or any other special group. Instead it calls for federal grants to the states beginning at $25 per child per year for general improvement as needed, school district by school district—a plan that would cost the federal government approximately $1 billion the first year and more than $4 billion a year by the fifth year. The NEA estimates that under its plan teachers' salaries would rise from the present average of $4,500 to $7,500 in those five years. It is their hope that the number and quality of teachers would rise accordingly.

The NEA's decision to concentrate on a basic program of federal contributions to the states instead of centering the fight, as in the past, on funds for school construction is probably inspired in part by their fear of stirring up another anti-segregation fight over the Powell Amendment. This is probably sound legislative strategy, for there is no reason to suppose that those who follow Powell's line would behave any more constructively this year than they have in the past.

What Did Lyndon Say (or Mean) and Why?

LYNDON JOHNSON is too driven, too anguished a man to be known through his words alone. American political parties, though, are known mostly through theirs, since they do so little. Their leaders, in conformity with the rules for men mantled by their groups, must say things as their members would have them said. When Johnson denounced the 40-hour week twice in one day, it mattered less that he had an explanation the next, than that the leader of the Democratic majority of the United States Senate had lent his liberal party's prestige to pressures against one of its most cherished liberal accomplishments. Here was a puzzle.

The prepared speech he carried with him to Waxahachie said only that the 40-hour week will not produce intercontinental ballistic missiles. As he had been making alarmist speeches about the Sputniks for weeks, the press paid little attention to this one. A *Dallas News* reporter was there, however, and he reported that Johnson said the United States may have to "go on a full, wartime mobilization schedule" and that this would mean giving up the 40-hour week and big profits, too.

"I don't mean having a profitless prosperity—but one in which agriculture, labor, and industry march hand-in-hand to get the big job done," he was quoted. "Business as usual will not place a satellite in the skies. Candor and frankness compel me to tell you that in my opinion the 40-hour week will not produce missiles."

Here was the Senate's Number One Democrat saying, "We are justified in calling for an end to the 40-hour week"—or so it seemed. His words were sent tap-tapping on the news machines up to the national labor convention in Atlantic City, N. J., that afternoon. It did not take the high-feather chiefs there assembled long to choose between Lyndon Johnson and the 40-hour week. David McDonald, president of the Steelworkers, said hundreds of thousands of his people "are working less than 40 hours a week right now" and would like to help make steel for military projects "by returning to at least the 40-hour week." Walter Reuther, who favors an even shorter work-week, said he'd have "plenty to say against Johnson's plan when we consider collective bargaining."

Johnson, meantime, was on his way to Dallas for a banquet in his honor that night. There he said, "We cannot produce the weapons of security—on time—if we think more of the 40-hour week or of 'business as usual.' . . . We need workers, farmers, professionals, technicals, business men. We must call back from retirement our senior citizens. . . . The only person who can defeat us is the American who spends his time explaining why he cannot deliver the goods. If heads must be knocked together, let's do it. If more money is needed, let's spend

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it. If more resources are needed, let's use them. If more work hours are needed, let's work them."

But of course Johnson read the reactions from Atlantic City and reflected upon them. At mid-morning the next day he had a special press conference at the Hotel Adolphus and said he had been referring only to the US missile program work-week.

"I wasn't referring to private industry or to the Army or the Navy when I spoke about ending the 40-hour week," he said, "I've said nothing that would indicate I felt our present laws should be repealed or the general industrial labor contracts should be renegotiated. What I'm talking about is developing operational ICBM's."

He had not been proposing anything, he said; he had merely been quoting the testimony of the Republican Defense Secretary, Neil McElroy, who had told the Johnson committee that "the limitation of overtime" had been "the principal bottleneck." (None of the morning stories had so noted.)

Johnson also said: "No one is more aware than I am of some soft spots in our economy . . . I have been disturbed by the creeping unemployment in some industries."

Why had so astute a politician, so sensitive a wind gauger, so accomplished a maneuverer (Mrs. Roosevelt's word) as Lyndon Johnson twice left the impression he was for junking the 40-hour week?

Several explanations seem tenable.

Perhaps he was careless about the way he worded his point—just got carried away. Surely he knows that the 40-hour week is as precious to working people as the depletion allowance is to the oil industry. He has never bobbled a defense of the allowance: why would he suddenly attack the 40-hour week unless he was saying what he did not mean? The most amiable view is that he was either misquoted or misinterpreted.

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But this explanation makes another series of facts mystifying. The *Dallas News* reported that several hours after his mid-morning press conference saying he had been misunderstood, he lunched at the *Dallas News* building. The next morning the *News*, under the caption, "That Animal Ain't Producin'," published a cartoon showing Johnson, shotgun poised, eyeing a goofy-looking cow labeled "40-hour week." A nose-to-heaven, mouth-agape figure, arms thrown heavenward, and labeled "Reuther," was running toward Johnson from the distance crying, "Spare that noble creature." There wasn't an intercontinental ballistic missile in sight. In an editorial wrapped around Johnson's picture, the *News* said, "Senator Johnson emphasized in Dallas that scientists can not manufacture it" (national security was the antecedent) "out of a 40-hour work week, let alone Walter Reuther's demanded four-day one. To put it baldly, a four-day week consigns you tomorrow to Communism. And eventually the five-day week may do that."

Johnson did not say that publicly, in Waxahachie or Dallas; did he go so far in the luncheon at the *Dallas News*? If not, and if the *News* was convinced, after lunch, by his denials in the morning, why that cartoon and editorial? Surely a multi-million-dollar newspaper which trumpets as its guiding rule, "Build the *News* upon the rock of truth and righteousness," would not fail to replace an editorial page to avoid promulgating an untruth about Johnson's position and an unjust slam at Reuther and labor based on the untruth. Would it? Perhaps it would.

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Another possibility is that Johnson was threatening labor. It is well known in Austin that national labor leaders have, on two occasions, come to believe that if their Texas counterparts do not stop resisting Johnson in Texas, it may go hard for labor's program in Congress. Whether Johnson himself has transmitted this threat, or whether the labor leaders in Washington have judged that this is the meaning of his protests because of what they think of his methods and values, I do not know, but on the one occasion the pressure led to a hedged commendation of Johnson in the State Federation of Labor newspaper, and on the other to a minimum but official turnout of labor leaders at a Houston appreciation dinner that was boycotted by most of the Harris County Democrats and Mrs. R. D. Randolph, the state's Democratic National Committeewoman. Johnson may have been thinking, "Well, I'll shade what I mean and remind them they better keep me cultivated. I run the Senate and they know it." (He says such things.) But, if he so thought, he learned almost immediately that he had gone too far. With unemployment at an eight-year high, labor didn't scare. And the headlines were too blunt; they just said he was for ending the 40-hour week. They gave shape to suspicions.

A third possibility is that Johnson may have been so distraught about Sputnik, he slipped and revealed too great a readiness to forego the welfare of working people. He used to be a New Dealer, but how times have changed! Early in December, in West Texas, he stirred a convention of the liberal Farmers' Union again and again with memories of the triumphs of Franklin Roosevelt and his alphabet agencies. "They brought the professors and more crackpots and dreamers to Washington than you ever saw—but what's important, a nation was saved!" he said. But, he added in an aside, he had been criticized a lot since those fighting days. "I have to admit I am perhaps more conservative than I once was," he said. "But I see no real change in my philosophy. When I was a young man of adventure with more guts than brains, I did some things I don't do today."

RONNIE DUGGER

Austin, Texas

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Some Popular Illusions about Rising Prices

OF LATE more sheer nonsense has been uttered concerning wage-price inflation than about any other non-celestial subject. That is not surprising. Rising consumer prices generally call forth a spate of specious reasoning, as interested parties seek to pin the guilt on some scapegoat. The Administration, business management, and organized labor seek to escape the blame for creeping inflation by pointing fingers at each other.

To management the culprit is negotiated wage increases in excess of gains in productivity. Historically, however, money incomes (largely wages) have always advanced faster than output. This has been true during every significant rise in the price level, unions or no unions. Instead of being "the cause of inflation," wage-productivity disparities may simply signify strong upward pressures throughout the economy. We can see this illustrated in the experience of England and Sweden during the two years 1948 to 1950, when the national unions agreed, at the request of labor governments, to forego wage increases as an anti-inflation measure. Actually in both countries wages kept rising as incentive earnings crept up and individual employers offered extra pay for labor.

Much of American management favors two- to five-year wage settlements, yet two features of such long-term agreements (automatic annual increases and consumer-price escalation) supply a built-in rigidity and upward price bias which are harmful in an economy subject to slumps. Foreordained wage increases in long-term agreements, which for 1957 applied automatically to 5 million workers, prevent pressures from reducing the size of wage advances during intervening business recessions; they also set the standard for other new negotiations that occur during such downswings. One of the reasons why the consumer price index has registered so steady a climb is the growing importance of "services," which compose over a third of the index. Services include medical and personal care, electricity and other utilities, transportation, and rent. As a group, these items have risen in price continuously since World War II, despite general business recessions about every four years—in 1949-50, 1953-54, and 1957-58.

To organized labor, wage increases are taken as an economic cure-all for almost everything. The recent AFL-CIO convention passed a resolution declaring that "the very fact of an economic slackening makes it doubly imperative that unions gain sizable wage increases to bolster consumer buying power" and stimulate "an upturn in the economy." That negotiation of "substantial" boosts for labor would prevent and overcome a recession like the current one is, however, questionable. The growth of consumption has been a rather steady factor in our post-war economy. The big spurts and relapses have occurred mainly in capital outlays—for new plants and equipment, manufacturers' inventories, and housing. The high-interest, tight-money policy, badly overdone in the past year, has been particularly destructive here. And changing the tight-money policy is therefore likely to be a better cure than boosting wages.

The AFL-CIO convention also supported a shorter work week "with no reduction in take home pay." For the most part this is another phase of the drive for additional hourly pay, because so far this year there has been little rank-and-file interest in a shorter work week *per se* either in the auto industry or elsewhere in the economy. Widespread unemployment could change the picture, but otherwise significant hours' reductions make little economic sense in view of the small prospective increase in the nation's workforce over the next decade and recent intensification of the cold war.

TO THE Administration, the answer is "restraint." A year ago President Eisenhower, in well guarded words, appealed to management and labor to show strict self-control in their wage and price policies. But last August, when the Auto Workers, in their $100-price-reduction proposal to the auto industry, called upon the Administration to clothe its platitudes, the Administration's evasive answers revealed that its program, like the Emperor in the children's fable, was really bare.

Consequently, when Building Trades President Richard Gray proposed a wage moratorium before the AFL-CIO convention, Agriculture Secretary Benson called it "sound economic policy" and Labor Secretary Mitchell said it deserved "serious consideration;" but no one, apparently, stopped to reflect that a wage freeze failed to hold prices down when it was tried in countries like Sweden, England and Holland.

Moreover, the wage-freeze advocates seem to have forgotten that the long-term contracts contain installment increases extending into 1958, 1959, and even 1960.

Superficially, lack of restraint by the unions in pushing for wage increases seems a plausible explanation for inflation. But studies of the world-wide inflation we have today point to a more basic conclusion: when there is relatively full employment as there is at present, there is also likely to be a problem of prices creeping up, regardless of whether there are unions or not.

RICHARD A. LESTER

The writer is professor of economics at Princeton University and a specialist in industrial relations.

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How 1957 Looked

to ~~Fitzpatrick~~ and ~~HERBLOCK~~

IN THE "ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH"

IN THE "WASHINGTON POST"

"Don't worry, I don't think there's anything in there."

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

"Ezra, I don't know what we'd do without you"

"Save the stove!"

"Yoo hoo, everybody."



"You say you have this impression that you keep smelling oil?"

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

Washington's space project

Faubus folly

NATO flu is bad, too

"What happened to it, Mr. Alcorn?"

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The Superficial Aspect

What a Sad Story

So Secretary Benson is going to eliminate the "marginal" farmer, comprising perhaps a third ot the present farm population, but producing only a tenth or less of the marketable agricultural products! Well, Mr. Henry A. Wallace may now step down from his historical niche as the most startling of Secretaries of Agriculture, for a secretary who would plow under pigs is by no means as astonishing as one who would plow under farmers.

Of course Mr. Benson is free of murderous propensities; he would plow under the farmers merely as farmers, not as persons. He is quite willing for them to survive; his purpose is merely to drive them off the land into industry. Since the only industry in thriving condition at present is the armament industry, Mr. Benson's policy reduces to the conversion of farmers into armorers.

In this he is definitely in line with the philosophy of the present regime. The business of the farmer is the production of food and clothing, that is to say, means of sustaining life. The business of an armorer is to produce the means of destroying life. Driving farmers off the land into the munitions factories means beating our plows into swords and our pruning-hooks into spears—learning nothing but war any more. A regime that adopts such a policy is therefore a regime whose thoughts are much concerned with death.

Perhaps this is the answer to those who have sought a clue to the basic character of the Eisenhower administration—a mortuary cast of thought, a fascination with cerecloths and winding- sheets, an instinctive revulsion against the gay and jocund, and a strong fixation upon

> . . . The knell, the shroud, the mattock and the grave,
> The deep, damp vault, the darkness and the worm.

At least this theory explains why an administration that found it possible to tolerate McCarthy for years, simply can't stand Stevenson. The gentleman from Illinois has been accused of many things, but never of being moribund; he can shine in almost any kind of gathering except a funeral, but as an Undertaker's Mute he is not a success.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Benson in turn have grappled with the same problem, and neither has solved it. But each has advanced a suggestion and the difference between their suggestions throws much light on the basic philosophies of the two men. We have attacked the problem of production with such success that our total product is now about ten percent greater than the capacity of our distributive system. We have dumped five percent of the working force, and ten percent of our total production, some forty billion dollars, into armament, which throws no economic goods into the channels of trade, and the distributive system, with that relief, is able to handle the rest.

But Mr. Wallace suggested that once our own people have been fed and clothed, means should be found to carry the surplus to some point of need; which was construed as a proposal to give every Hottentot a daily quart of milk. Mr. Benson now proposes that we take a third of the farmers off the job of producing the staff of life and put them to fabricating the seeds of death, capable of exterminating the Hottentots.

Mr. Wallace envisaged the possibility that most of us, of the Russians, and of the Hottentots may continue to live indefinitely. Mr. Benson faces the somber truth that all men must die, and urges us to make sure that the others die first.

Mr. Benson's conviction of mortality cannot be challenged. We must, indeed, die, but it is possible that a number of interesting, amusing, perhaps inspiring things may happen first and some people consider that possibility worth at least as much attention as any *memento mori*. For instance, there should be some organization of Civil Defense against a sudden outbreak of genuine peace. What would we do with all the pigs and the milk that the soldiers are now consuming, and with all the steel and chemicals that would not go into guided missiles? If no improvement is made in our system of distribution, we may confidently look forward to another 1929 *et seq.* But to date the administration has advanced no impressive proposals to meet that contingency.

To be candid, the opposition has not been conspicuously better. To some extent the coffin-lid seems to be clamped down on the Democrats, too, and they resolutely refuse to give serious consideration to the hypothesis that this generation may live long and prosper. Even the ebullient Mr. Stevenson seems somewhat dashed by the funereal atmosphere of Washington. Perhaps he has not actually adopted the fashion of composing dirges, but it is not to be denied that he sings low. It is depressing, very depressing, so depressing that when Washington gets about five degrees more lachrymose it is going to become comic.

Gerald W. Johnson

Gerald W. Johnson will speak in Beverly Hills, California, on Wednesday, January 22. For reservations *NR* readers are invited to call CR 4-3252.

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Faculties Have Too Much Power

Sun-ripened Reflections of a Teacher

by REED WHITTEMORE

As I WRITE this the season is just beginning. The beaches on the Gulf Coast are empty of tourists, crowded with birds. Next week, we are told, it will be different; the hotels and cottages will start to fill up, the rates will rise, and perhaps the temperature, in sympathy, will too.

We have rented an improbably expensive house on Longboat Key where (it says in the circulars) De Soto first landed. The house faces the calm backwater between the Key and the mainland, but is only two hundred yards from the Gulf itself. It therefore partakes of both worlds and is described by realtors as ideally situated. Like all the houses here it has no basement but rests, about two feet above the ground, on cement piles topped by metal rat-deflectors similar to those placed on ships' hawsers.

Our neighbor is the chief of police. He feeds raccoons. We are told he has fifteen or so under his care, but we have only seen four. We hear rustlings at night under the house and say to each other hopefully: "raccoons."

There are, or have been, writers about. Manuel Komroff is supposed to have painted the front of the post office. Budd Schulberg is in the telephone book. MacKinlay Kantor and Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings are referred to as attractions in the circulars. There are also palms, pelicans, Cadillacs, elephants on water skis, horseshoe crabs, the red tide, Dow-Jones, U-Drive-Em Boats and a three percent sales tax. Up the road John Ringling has left us an unfinished "super-luxury multi-million dollar hotel" boasting "swimming-pool-sized-moats and fishpools in the lobby."

If I were a novelist I think I would like to emulate Thomas Mann who made a very good thing of resorts. But his resorts were European; his characters went to them to get away, to recover from some ailment that usually resembled *Weltschmerz,* and to contemplate the nature of things at ease on a beach or in an Alpine sunroom. Here, although most tourists arrive with the getting-away metaphysic in their heads, they are of course not away at all, but very centrally located. Not only are Wall Street, the realtors and the swank shops present, but our whole materialist culture is to be found here in its purest, most concentrated state, a state compounded of money and comfort solely. A cynic might say that here is where our American sputniks first foundered, not at Cape Canaveral; he would be wrong, but not so wrong as Thomas Mann would have been if he had tried to make this his magic mountain. The only part of our culture missing here (I'd say from two weeks' experience) is the part vaguely having to do with the mind—a small part, but particularly noticeable to me, coming as I do from a college town. If I were from Westchester I wouldn't miss it; but as I am not I feel something like the pelican (I think it was a pelican) I saw floating and sunning himself just offshore yesterday There he was, afloat on the vast briny deep, having apparently no visible source of sustenance, tiny and alone like Housman in a world he had not made; and yet before my eyes he would occasionally stick his great beak slowly, lethargically into the water and draw up a big fish. Gobble gobble. Well, I have little or nothing to gobble except a copy of Johnson's *Rasselas,* but I am gobbling. It is good too—all about the Happy Valley (Longboat Key).

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It is at this distance (from the academic life) that I feel suddenly blessed by a great capacity for generalization. Sitting here watching the boats pass by, hearing the faint splashes of fish in the backwater, and reflecting that I have no classes to meet, no papers to correct, no obligations to anyone (except a few thousand creditors), I am suddenly become a visionary. I see all that is wrong with our educational processes—why science is on the wane, why Freshmen can't write, why a Ph.D. is no longer a sign meaning, "Here is a wise man." I feel, in short, like a journalist, one of those editorial chaps who explains why we are behind the Russians. It is a great feeling, I assure you, an unprecedented feeling (for me) of freedom from minutiae. The freedom does not extend of course to my immediate family life—for our children

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are with us and we are far too busy getting them to eat their eggs to concern ourselves with principles. But up *there*, up in the north where the eight o'clocks are meeting, I can see every flaw in the bloody cocoanut . . .

. . . the wind is freshening from the northwest. That means good shell hunting.

For one thing the students don't work hard enough. For another they haven't sufficient respect for the wonders of the mind. For a third they are too narrowly oriented; all they look forward to is a comfortable job without responsibility in a large corporation (see *The Organization Man*). But above and beyond all these minor intellectual failings there is one major defect in our whole system of higher education (there is also a group of sandpipers scurrying in and out, following the wave edges): the faculty. The faculty has too much power.

Thesis. Irony.

There are some persons of course—mostly faculty members—who, lusting for power themselves, think that at present the faculties of our colleges have too little say on campus. These gentlemen would deprive the trustees, presidents and administrations of their traditional and proper hold on the colleges' purse strings, and would set up some damfool Platonic state where teachers and thinkers rule and administrators merely administer. They say that the faculty, like the Congress of the United States, should have the power, the economic power, really to *run* the colleges, not be run by them—should be empowered (as no faculty now is) to decide on the college's major budgetary allocations. Then, they say, it might be possible to devote less than 50 percent of a college's gross income to athletics, administration, alumni activities, student unions and campus beautification.

Nonsense, of course. From my distance I can laugh at such notions (and at the lizard who, trying to crawl up our steps, keeps falling down). Personally I am confident that there is not a faculty now in existence capable of using such vast power sensibly; and if any reputable college were suddenly to endow its faculty with these powers the place would be wholly committed to study, pure science and bankruptcy in six months. Indeed I might go so far as to say that in six months . . .

. . . But at the moment I am watching a bunch of tiny sand crabs who live in holes on our beach (on the bay side). They look like spiders. They are very skittish, and when I approach they all magically vanish. Then I wait quietly, not moving at all, and one or two of them come out slowly, tentatively and sit by the side of their holes either eating their sand or sanding their eats, I can't tell which. I make the slightest motion and, whoof, they are gone.

What is it that holds our colleges together now but faculty impotence? (Irony). Let us have more of *that* if we're to beat the Russians. Let us have a more centrally *oriented* organization for higher education; let us if necessary have an educational czar; let us . . .

. . . But on the ocean side the wind is up, the sea is rough, and thousands of wonderful shells are being newly deposited on the beach. I pick one up; it is a left-handed whelk (busycon perversa), a mere baby of a whelk, scarcely two inches long, and yet the regular striations which mark its slow, deliberate growth must number over a hundred. Maturity!—how difficult to attain. Not by legislative decrees, not by crash programs, not even by editorials, but slowly like a shell or vegetable, and quietly, away from the wave's beat.

Analogy.

On a windy day like today the seagulls, flying into the wind, stay in the same place for minutes at a time, searching the turbulent water below for their prey. Then they dive straight down (and the pundits on shore watch, thinking furiously) and are gone from sight under the waves for several seconds (and the pundits continue to watch). At last, beating their wings against the sea's surface, they rise heavily into the air, gobble gobble, to continue their perpetual search.

And on a busy day like today the mailman, beating his way against the wind up Gulf of Mexico Drive, sometimes stays at the same postbox for minutes at a time . . .

He did not at ours.

Lament.

Last summer a colleague of mine said that the big trouble with the academic novels of our time (like the *Groves of Academe*) is that their authors are not sufficiently concerned with the sources of power on campus. That was last July; we were just walking to lunch after a hard, hot morning, and I couldn't think of any reply to her profundity except a nod of my head. She added that the result was triviality; I nodded my head again. Now, however, over my shells and crabs, I have brought forth an answer:

The fault, madam, is not with the novelists. I would have you note that one of the best of contemporary academic novels, *The Homecoming Game* by Howard Nemerov, faces squarely up to the issues of faculty power and becomes in effect a parody of faculty impotence. For *there*, Madam, and not in the novels, is the rub. Our teachers are at present powerless both by inclination and necessity to change the sad state of things. And I say to you that if this country is again to resume its place in the sun its faculties must rise, unite, throw off their chains . . .

. . . But if I remember correctly, this is not at all what Nemerov said.

Our telephone number is Fulton 8-2759.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Psychology of Farce

by Eric Bentley

IDEALLY a compendium of exact information and intelligent opinion, an encyclopedia addresses itself, in fact, to the codification of current prejudices. The article on farce in the only encyclopedia of theatre in our language starts out this way:

> *Farce*, an extreme form of comedy in which laughter is raised at the expense of probability, particularly by horseplay and bodily assault. It must, however, retain its hold on humanity, even if only in depicting the grosser faults of mankind; otherwise it degenerates into travesty and burlesque.

After remarking, *en passant*, that farce died out before Molière, the writer winds round to this conclusion:

> In modern usage, the word farce is applied to a full-length play dealing with some absurd situation hinging generally on extra-marital relations—hence the term bedroom farce. Farce has small literary merit, but great entertainment value, and owing to its lack of subtlety can be translated from one language to another more easily than comedy.

"An extreme form." The tone is patronizing. Why? Is extremity bad? And if farce is already an extremity, how can it further *degenerate into travesty and burlesque?* And why does the writer have it in for travesty and burlesque? Or is it just that everything is a degenerate something else: burlesque is degenerate farce, farce is degenerate comedy, comedy is degenerate tragedy . . . ? *At the expense of probability.* And why not? Why should not probability have its price? *Even if only in depicting the grosser faults of mankind.* Why "even if only"? Is this such a contemptible or easy thing to do? Why be hoity-toity about gross faults? *Owing to its lack of sublety it can be translated . . . more easily.* Not "its lack of subtlety of language," please note, but its "lack of subtlety," *tout court.* That farce has subtlety in other spheres than dialogue is nowhere intimated, and that even its dialogue often has subtlety of a kind (I am thinking not only of the obvious case of Wilde but of the more orthodox farceurs like Labiche and Feydeau) is completely overlooked. *Small literary merit but great entertainment value.* In the middle of this phrase the subject switches abruptly from the inherent qualities of the work to the response of an audience. And are we to understand that a work pleases an audience by its lack of merit? Merit apart, it would seem psychologically necessary to attribute pleasure to the presence, not the absence, of something. But, of course, the whole article is based on the opposite assumption—that farce consists of defects without qualities.

WHAT WE UNCOVER, then, in this guide to theatre is a massive prejudice against one of the most honorable and remarkable forms of dramatic art. It is not a new prejudice. The comment was made on Labiche's admission to the Academy that it was farce, the first of theatre arts in France, that was now being honored — last. The "literature" of the subject is, accordingly, very slender, and in fact the only thorough descriptions of farce are to be found in works on comedy or laughter. There is, for example, no better account of the mechanisms of farcical plot than Bergson's famous essay; references to Labiche abound in it; but Bergson's subject is laughter, and even life, in general. Most dramatic critics assume that the farcical bag of tricks was easy to amass and is even easier to use. Once there is a bed on stage, and some confusion as to its proper occupancy, no difference is noted between the clumsiness of a tyro and the virtuosity of a master. The craftsmanship of Feydeau is as complex, and, yes, as subtle as any in the whole history of drama, yet when one of his plays is done in Anglo-Saxon countries we inevitably have to hear it talked down to as a quaint period piece.

If farce is more readily acknowledged as an ingredient in higher comedy, it has not always been welcome even there. Molière has been scolded for using farce by generations of critics, beginning with his own generation. He would certainly have roused more enthusiasm in Anglo-Saxon countries had he left farce entirely alone. Confronted with Molière the young American asks: "If he wants to be taken seriously, why isn't he serious?" Conversely, a playwright of half Molière's talent could secure a reputation for twice as much by replacing the farcical elements with what might be called certified seriousness, that is, currently fashionable psychology and sociology.

MELODRAMA—the counterpart of farce on the tragic side—is in similar disrepute. The term, like the term farce, is used to show contempt for something admirable or admiration for something contemptible. Yet just as the supreme master of comedy, Molière, was an incorrigible farceur, the supreme master of tragedy, Shakespeare, was an incorrigible melodramatist. Explaining this away has provided employment for generations of scholars. They have advanced such arguments as these: Shakespeare wasn't as great as he is cracked up to be, and melodrama is one of his many Gothic mistakes of taste; Shakespeare was so great he could get away with anything, even melodrama; Shakespeare may have been melodramatic, but he wasn't as melodramatic as Marlowe or Webster; Shakespeare wasn't melodramatic, there's a consistent and naturalistic psychology to him once you find out how many children Lady Macbeth had. . . . And to this day, it is impossible to stage a Shakespearean tragedy without inviting, from the press in general and the *New Yorker* in particular, a lot of heavy irony on the subject of stage villains, the pile of corpses in the last scene, or some other melodramatic item. If a bit of melodrama actually takes a critic's fancy, he will hasten to assure you that this is not Shakespeare at his best: it is a case of *small literary merit but great entertainment value.*

The words farce and melodrama are now so devalued that one would wish them discarded like farthings and one-lira bills, were it not that they would then have to be speedily replaced because what they refer to—in Elizabethan tragedy, the comedy of Molière, or even the

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classic American novel—is central to literature and drama. And it is not a defect but a quality. The "absurd" plots of tragedies from *Oedipus Rex* to *King Lear* represent, not a failure of primitive man to be mature, but the refusal of tragic man to limit himself to naturalism. The feeling one had as a child that the "absurd" opening scene in *Lear* was supremely right is justified. The "absurdity" expresses the real absurdity of life, of which our encyclopedist's "probability" is a misleading mask. If art imitates life, it should be added that while naturalistic art imitates the surfaces, "melodramatic" art imitates what is beneath the surface. It is a matter, then, of finding external representation—symbol—for what cannot be photographed or described. As such symbols, the plots of the masters are apt, expressive, economic, and amazing. Aristotle, who has more often been thought too rational than not rational enough, put the plots of the Greek tragedies before all their other properties, and made a special favorite of *Oedipus Rex,* which has the "absurdest" plot of any.

It may be that the principle of the primacy of plot holds for all drama. It certainly holds for melodrama and farce. Here in the action lies that subtlety which is sometimes and notoriously absent from dialogue and even character. The enacted story is itself a language. And this is to say that it is symbolic. Like dreams, farces show the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes. That is a Freudian formula but not, surely, one that only Freudians can accept. For one thing the comparison between farce and dream is a matter, up to a point, not of analogy but identity. Examining my own dreams, I have been not a little surprised to discover how many affinities they show with Chaplin films—in ideas for a whole sequence of action (chases in automobiles, "routines" of dressing or moving furniture) or in characterization (heroes and villains, "chickens" and bullies) or even in style of performance (large grimaces and gesticulation being very much in order).

The word *repressed* brings us back to our encyclopedist's remarks about grossness. Repressed wishes find an outlet, surely, in all drama; many repressed wishes are gross ones; and if we take the family to be the very center of culture, we should not be surprised that gross wishes are mainly, if not exclusively, desires to damage the family, to desecrate the household gods. Consider the Greeks, who had just created the family. They naturally found the supreme virtue in the pious and loyal relation of husband to wife, of child to parent, of sibling to sibling. The subject of tragedy is the violation of this piety. What, then, would be the worst conceivable violation of both the marital and filial pieties? Why, the double crime of Oedipus. And the phrase "some absurd situation hinging on extra-marital relations" is richly suggestive of tragic plot—the plot of *Othello,* for example.

But what situation "hinging on extra-marital relations" is not full of absurdities and therefore potentially melodramatic or farcical, tragic or comic, according to the temperament, state of mind, and view of life of the witness? Outrage to family piety and propriety is certainly at the heart of farce—"hence," as the book says, "the term bedroom farce." Indeed, the fearsomeness of the enterprise might explain why people prefer either to brush farce off as totally meaningless or assign it a meaning that could never explain its prodigious energy. For example, the great dramatic critic Sarcey, noting that serious plays about adultery were unsavory, concluded that playwrights should get a little fun out of the subject instead: he justified farce on grounds of its triviality, and one is surprised, perhaps, to find Labiche agreeing with him.

If Sarcey's view—though preferable to the Anglo-Saxon notion that adultery should be banished from the drama altogether—is one that skims the surface, there is a more widely current view that is merely an error—the idea that "wicked" comedy, farce or otherwise,

The Key

LIKE any other you might say, and yet
What more than keys possess identity?
Thus I did dig it up, not someone else,
In my own garden seven years ago,
It having lain since then on my bookcase,
Taunting my random glance, until at last
I've come to this, the shrewd, imperious poem;
Yet much like any other after all:
Bit and pin, collar and stem and bow—
The dictionary names the parts—and all
Dark with old rust, smelling of earth and iron,
That is to say like ferns just after rain,
And twisted slightly as if its lock had stuck
And someone had tried to force it. Who? What lock?
Perhaps it shut two lovers in, or shut
One out. And since the key has promised love,
How much more might the universe contain?
Unlock, unlock. But this is a lock long lost
And anyway was no more than a door.
The key is a mere product of my garden,
Another flower, a blade of reality.
Is this a lock? Such bits, such aspects, grow,
Rise from the massive, indeterminate soil,
As poems from consciousness, whole and concrete,
Blooming in bold array, a myriad bush,
Flesh in scintillant inventory. The ground,
A garden, lasts, made bearable in love,
The indispensable sustenance of love.
A blush of substance petals us and keys,
And we also return at last to the ground
And are found again, or not. The lockless key
Seeks its acknowledgment from everyone,
From him whose peculiar motions weave the poem,
From you who sit so quiet reading there.

HAYDEN CARRUTH

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French or English-Restoration, is amoral. It is hard to imagine what true indifference to morals could produce, if anything at all. Comedy and farce presuppose accepted standards, and when the playwrights don't respect those standards, they resent them. If English Puritanism were ever totally forgotten, it could still be deduced from Restoration Comedy, which was born under the sign of Oliver Cromwell. And it is interesting that the word we today apply to bawdy farces is "naughty"—a word that belongs essentially to the vocabulary of mothers and nursemaids, the appointed deputies of the superego. Where there is no established virtue, there can be no sense of outrage, and farce, as we have seen, is no less "outrageous" than tragedy.

THE MARRIAGE JOKE, then, exists only for a culture that knows itself committed for marriage. But is the joke necessary or even salutary? There is a growing tendency in modern civilization to think that it is neither. Only the other day, I happened upon a magazine headline: "Don't let them scoff at marriage," which turned out to be the title of an article blaming "the moral crisis of today" on the marriage joke and attributing that joke to the post-1945 generation as if it had not been told through the centuries.

It is true, however, that the marriage joke could be abolished if the family were the unmixed blessing that many of our contemporaries take it for. In another recent article, the chief of the division of Social Medicine at an important American hospital writes as follows:

> The family is central to the development of humanity not only for the perpetuation of the race but because the proper psychological development of an individual can only occur within the warm circle of the nuclear family. Social and psychological studies indicate quite clearly that a strong family structure helps to develop and maintain a personality free of dangerous (to self and society) characteristics.

The author draws the conclusion that sexual deviation and juvenile delinquency can be prevented by closer, warmer family relations, and no doubt there is some truth in this. Unhappily there is evident truth in precisely the opposite proposition. The close, warm family is also a seedbed of neurosis, vice, and crime. About the same time as this article appeared,* a newspaper picture caught my eye. It showed a beaming public relations executive with his good-looking wife and three attractive children. They seemed a model American family in a model American home, and one could imagine the picture passing in triumph around the public relations office. The caption underneath, however, reported that the mildest and most candid-looking of the boys had just killed the mother and sister and told the police that he had planned to kill the rest of the family as well. It would be comforting to think that such a shocking event could be declared irrelevant to the experience of normal folk. But, however psychotic that poor lad's behavior, the fact remains that neurosis and psychosis are extensions of patterns present in us all. The understanding attitude to Hitler's massacres is not: "How could he ever dream of such a thing?" but: "How could he ever have done what others only dream of?"

THE CRUELTY of sick behavior and healthy fantasy is found also in farce. In Charlie Chaplin's film farces, for instance. Though what we consciously remember from them may be Chaplin's incomparable delicacy, they are for the most part taken up with violent pursuit and violent combat. Fantasy multiplies movements and blows by a thousand. The villain is a giant whose strength passes the limits of nature. He can bend lamp-posts with his bare hands. Since the "little man's" revenges have to be more than proportionate to the provocation (as with Brecht's *Jenny the Pirate's Bride*), he can drop a cast-iron stove on the villain's head and ram that head inside a street lamp with the gas turned on. Another symptom of cruelty is the abstractness of the violence. Prongs of a rake in the backside are received as pin pricks. Bullets seem to pass right through people, sledge-hammer blows to produce only momentary irritation. The speeding up of movement contributes to the abstract effect. So, even more, does the silence proper to the screen of those days, many of the effects being lost when a soundtrack is super-imposed. The cops shoot, but there is no noise. Heavy objects fall, but there is no crash. Gruesome in-fighting has the air of shadow-boxing. . . . All of which signifies that, in farce, as in dreams, one is permitted the outrage but spared the consequences. Chaplin's delicacy of style is actually part of the pattern: he parades an air of nonchalance when acting in a manner that, in real life, would land him in Bellevue or Sing Sing.

But while dreams are ignored or forgotten, farces incur the censure of professional moralists and amateur psychologists. The thought arises: "The theatre is inciting my children to hate the home, if not to commit murder and arson. We must have more censorship!" It is overlooked that such fantasies are kept for dreams and pictures and plays just because each of us already has within him so strong a censorship, and it is wrongly inferred from the power of the fantasies that people are likely to fail to distinguish between fantasy and reality. On a person who could not distinguish between fantasy and reality, Chaplin movies might well have as disastrous effect *except that such a person is already too far gone to go much further.* Though, from the devil's standpoint, Hitler excels the rest of us in having the courage to do what we all dream of doing, from the standpoint of mental hygiene, the Satanic superman must simply be adjudged a lunatic, while those who refuse to act out their morbid fantasies are, in that respect at least, sensible and sane.

This is the first section of a two-part essay by Mr. Bentley. The whole article will appear in a slightly different form as the preface to a forthcoming Hill and Wang anthology of farce.

* May 25th, 1957, in *The Nation.*

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Business in Perspective

by Van R. Halsey Jr.

THE WORK of recent writers on business falls roughly into three categories. The conservative school is comprised of revisionist historians who seek to remove the tarnish from the reputations of the Robber Barons, business commentators who are busy proving that the modern corporation has developed a social conscience, and second-rate novelists who tell us the human values really do triumph in executive suites.

The middle of the roaders, like Mabel Newcomber and William Miller, concern themselves with the statistics of business history and avoid making value judgments about the implications of the data they gather on the big executive or the big business organizations.

The American Business System, by Thomas Cochran (Harvard; $4.75).

The most widely discussed category is that being written by journalists, sociologists, TV writers and novelists who have been lambasting the businessman for being other-directed, an organization man, a Willis Wayde, or a flannel-suited yes-man in league with motivational researchers exploiting the unwary with hidden persuaders.

MR. COCHRAN'S new book cannot be placed in any of these groups. Rather, he uses material from all of them in his view of business as an organic and fundamental institution of American history. Emphasis is placed upon the development of the institutions of business and the changing role of entrepreneurship in their interactions with the rest of American civilization.

Beginning with the heritage of business attitudes and values in Pre-World War I America, the first part of the book (1900-1930) examines the big corporation and the managerial system together as "the fundamental business development of the 20th Century" having their basis in technological changes.

For example, the impact of cheap electric power by 1905 and the rise of the trucking industry in the 20's, (itself made possible by the capital investment in roads in response to the popularity of the automobile) facilitated the change from three- or four-story factories to one-story plants, and a wide dispersal of operations, which in turn spurred management's development of better communications, mechanized office equipment and advances in accounting techniques.

Technological changes such as these, plus an incentive for a commanding position in the market, not only led to bigger business organizations, but also had, as Mr. Cochran makes clear, consequences for managerial practices. Thus the organization man has had his social and economic role conditioned by the complexities of the big companies whose multiplant operations demand that he be plugged in at outlets scattered across the nation.

In like manner, his values have changed to a demand for security and status as the business emphasis shifted from price warfare and personal profit to high stable prices dependent upon advertising and long range planning.

Mr. Cochran performs a real service by clearly defining the areas and characteristics of small, medium, and managerial business. He does not limit himself to the giant corporations, as the critics of the deleterious effects of business usually do.

In a remarkably comprehensive view, he ranges from an estimation of the number of policy-making executives in the "big" corporations at the turn of the century (less than 50,000), to the life expectancy of a mid-century drug store; from the differences in the regional developments of business in 1900, to the various patterns found today in such states as Texas, California and Colorado. And even though the distinctions between the attitudes of the small and large businessman are blurred by common habits and aims, these useful definitions should serve as references for future business commentators.

It is Mr. Cochran's view, amply documented, that in spite of all talk to the contrary, there is more opportunity for both starting a small business, and achieving a successful career in big business than in the days of no government aid, smaller organizations, and continuing family influence.

IN CLOSING Mr. Cochran discusses the implications of his interpretation, particularly in terms of the disparity between business values and those of the common people. Regardless of the seeming increase in business opportunity, the trouble is that "in the course of growth from small shop to great corporation it [American business] failed to embody in its structure and operation some basic ideals of American culture." Themes that emphasize the American democratic and religious heritage, such as a belief in equality, the right of the individual to have an equal voice in making decisions effecting the common welfare, the need for justification of behavior in terms of Christian morality, have often conflicted with business action. As the key protagonist in the struggle with world Communism, and as the chief interpreter of American ideals to the world at large, American Business must somehow "fit physically and economically into a state of military strength; and it must find its particular role in the attitude

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and beliefs associated with the American world mission."

It is refreshing to find a book which is neither another defense of business, nor another polemic against business bureaucracy, but rather a well-balanced perspective by a responsible historian who is willing to challenge the ingrained assumption of superior business understanding.

A 19th-Century Portrait Gallery

by Dan Pinck

IRIS ORIGO is a superb biographer. The daughter of an American and an Englishwoman, she is married to an Italian marchese, has lived most of her life in Italy and is the author of *The Merchant of Prato*, a fascinating account (recently published in this country) of the life of a medieval Tuscan merchant.

In the first essay of her new book, an essay about Allegra, the illegitimate daughter of Byron and Claire Claremont, the author has written a stunning account of Lord Byron. Her craftsmanship and selection, her form and style, at once a mixture so keen and subtle, disarmingly and magnificently presents a portrait of one of the most repulsive and totally obnoxious characters in history.

A Measure of Love, by Iris Origo (Pantheon; $4.50).

Claire, William Godwin's stepdaughter, literally threw herself at Byron, much to her life-long dismay. ("Have you then," she writes to him, "any objection to the following plan? On Thursday evening we may go out of town together by some stage or mail about the distance of ten or twelve miles. There we shall be free and unknown. . . . ") Allegra, the daughter of this union, is taken by Claire and the Shelleys to live with Byron in Italy where, her mother hopes, she can expect to have greater advantages.

Byron refers to Allegra as "the Bastard" and "it" and soon, confined by a new mistress and an increasing menagerie that included a badger, a goat, a wolf, and monkeys, places Allegra, aged four, in a convent. He will not allow, despite Shelley's protestations, her mother to see her; nor does he see her himself.

When Allegra becomes sick and writes him a letter asking him to visit her, Byron refuses to go because he does not consider her letter flattering enough. At the age of five years and three months Allegra dies in the convent. Byron haggles over the funeral bills, which are never paid in full, and which are sent to Byron's executors after his death. Miss Origo says: "The story of Allegra is unbearably sad, not because a little child dies too young, but because the wrangles for her possession were, on both sides, echoes of adult pride, folly and self-love, with never a trace of tenderness."

In another portrait one cringes to hear Carlyle calling his wife Jane "Goody, dear" and Lady Ashburton, alternately, "O daughter of Adam most beautiful," "I think you seem beautifuller," and " . . . Of you I think as of the beautifullest creature in all the world." Both Carlyle and his wife are almost inconceivably articulate about this situation, with the wife probably the sharper wit. Carlyle, blundering between his plain Jane and his "glorious Queen," trying "to reconcile the irreconcilable," had a miserable time of it. Of Jane and Carlyle: "each was to the other what the pearl is to the oyster: a perpetual irritant."

Carlyle, invited for weeks on end to Lady Harriet's great country house, sometimes with Jane, writes, "The day goes along in consulting how the day shall go." Carlyle is considerate and he advises Lady Harriet: "Jane is very poorly; you will be as soft to her as you can." And Lady Harriet was kind to Jane. Thomas Carlyle declined into deep sorrow when Lady Ashburton died, but his spirits revived when, less than a year later, Lord Ashburton remarried, and both Carlyle and Jane resumed a pleasanter, if not so demanding, relationship with the second Lady Ashburton.

The Countess Marina Benzon ran a salon of good repute in Venice, and her pursuit of love in old age is the theme of another essay. Everlastingly hungry for food and love, —she carried hot *polenta* in her ample bosom whenever she traveled in her gondola and dashed off passionate letters whenever her lover left town. Of the remaining two essays, only the one on Giuseppe Mazzini seems to belong in this book. The other on Marie Leneru, the blind and deaf writer who is remembered for her journals, has no relation in time or place to the rest.

VIEWPOINTS

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RECORDS

Conductors and Quartets

GUIDO CANTELLI'S "claims to distinction as a symphonic maestro," the *New Yorker's* critic once observed down his nose, "have always seemed to me rather dim"; but they were impressively clear to the not easily impressed Toscanini and NBC Symphony. Toscanini was impressed by the performances that resembled his own in the accuracy of their realizations of the composer's score, in the purity of their musical style and taste, in their continuity and coherence, their clarity of outline, texture and structure, their precision of execution; he was also impressed by the young man's fanatical dedication; and these things must have been in his mind when he said, his face glowing at the thought of Cantelli: "I love this young conductor. I think is like me when I was young."

The orchestra was impressed, at rehearsals, by Cantelli's technical powers, the authority of the kind of knowledge of everything in the score and everything going on in the orchestra that commands the respect and response of the players. And he must have impressed the London Philharmonia in the same way, to judge from the precise, sensitive and beautiful-sounding playing in the performances of Schubert's *Unfinished* and Mendelssohn's *Italian* Symphonies on Angel 35524, and Debussy's *Nuages* and *Fêtes* and his *Prélude à L'Aprés-midi d'un faune* on Angel 35525 (with Ravel's *Daphnis et Chloé Suite* No. 2). The performances are characteristic in the way each—clear in texture, coherent in shape—is completely achieved to the last note of the last phrase; and with one exception they are deeply satisfying and effective statements of the works. The exception is the Mendelssohn, with its deliberate tempos in which the first three movements are insufficiently animated and get to be a little wearisome. But if Cantelli fails here he succeeds in what he attempts in *Fêtes*: Toscanini's practice of setting a single tempo—in this instance the tempo of the procession in the middle section—for the several sections of a piece.

These records grieve us with their evidence of the great talent that was lost to us with Cantelli's death; but other records have brought heartening evidence of another exceptional talent—that of Ataulfo Argenta. There was, on London LL-1275 a year or so ago, a performance of Tchaikovsky's Fourth similar to Cantelli's in its accuracy and distinguished taste—which is to say, its freedom from the traditional distortions. And now London LL-1735 gives us performances with L'Orchestre de la Suisse Romande of Debussy's *Images* for orchestra. The second, *Ibéria*, is standard repertory; but the others, *Gigues* and *Rondes de printemps*, are almost never played, though the aural image of spring in *Rondes* is one of the high points in Debussy's evocative orchestral invention. The profusion and density of the invention make *Rondes* difficult to play effectively; and Argenta's impressive achievement is a performance which makes the texture marvelously clear and the progression coherent. Very fine, too, are the performances of *Gigues* and *Ibéria*.

IN ADDITION the talented American Thomas Schippers conducts the London Philharmonia in a good performance of Prokofiev's Symphony No. 5 on Angel 35327; Mendelssohn's charming music for *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is on London LL-1707, performed well by Maag with the London Symphony, Jennifer Vyvyan and Marion Lowe, sopranos, and a chorus; and on Angel 45005 Markevitch conducts the National Orchestra of the French Radio in a good performance of his arrangement of Bach's *Musical Offering*, which except for the magnificent concluding six-voiced ricercare remains, for my ears, one of Bach's musically uninteresting exercises of his craftsmanship.

The Columbia recordings of Mozart's quintets for strings played by the Budapest Quartet and Walter Trampler, viola, remind us of another grievous loss; for Trampler was a member of the recently disbanded New Music Quartet, which exhibited a technical, musical and ensemble incandescence beyond anything achieved by other quartets. Its disbandment leaves the Budapest supreme; and the pacing and phrasing in these performances of the Mozart quintets are even finer than in the group's earlier performances with Milton Katims. As for the works—K.515 and 516 on ML-5192, K.593 and 614 on 5193, K.406 on 5191 (with the inconsequential K.174)—the best-known, K.516 in G minor, is unique among the quintets, in its affecting expressive content, as K.550 in G minor is among the symphonies; but K.515 is of equal stature, and the others of only slightly less (K.406 is an arrangement of the Serenade K.388 for winds; and I find the string version more effective than the original). The recorded sound continues to be dry, hard and—in the case of the first violin—excessively sharp, requiring reduction of treble.

THE BUDAPEST QUARTET is supreme; but others offer strong competition; and two of the best are the Juilliard, which plays Mozart's Quartets K.387 and 465 on Victor LM-2167 and Haydn's fine Op. 77 No. 1 and less interesting Op. 74 No. 1 on 2168, and the Hollywood, which plays Beethoven's late quartets on Capitol PER-8394. The flaw in these performances is the poor tone of the Juilliard first violin, which is made sharp by the recording, and the tremulous, veiled tone of the Hollywood first violin in soft passages; except for that, the performances are first-rate quartet operations and musically satisfying realizations of the works. The Hollywood performances are heard in excessive resonance which sounds like that of an echo chamber.

Beethoven's infrequently played Violin Sonata Op. 96—with its strangely lovely opening movement and powerful slow variation in the finale in which there are foreshadowings of the music of his last years—is given a remarkably perceptive performance by Arthur Grumiaux and Clara Haskil on Epic LC-3381. Similar foreshadowings are heard in the slow sections of the two Cello Sonatas Op. 102, which are played admirably by Artur Balsam and Zara Nelsova in London's recording (LLA-52) of all of Beethoven's sonatas and variations for cello and piano.

B. H. HAGGIN

Notes on Contributors

ERIC BENTLEY, for several years *NR's* drama critic, is Brander Matthews Professor of Drama at Columbia. HAYDEN CARRUTH was formerly the editor of *Poetry* magazine. VAN R. HALSEY JR. is on the faculty of Amherst. DAN PINCK's next book will be published later this season.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

though, as you know, I do not share in its broad implication that the Federal Government should meet the major financial burden of our educational needs. I believe that it is important to keep the essential responsibility for education in the hands of States and local communities and private organizations, with the Federal Government assuming a role of leadership and stimulus in those areas of greatest need.

M. B. FOLSOM
Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
Washington, D. C.

➤ *What Johnny Needs to Know*

SIRS:

LEWIS SAWIN and Arthur Norman have indirectly reflected (*"What Johnny Needs to Know," NR*, Dec. 23) the despair which most teachers of college freshmen feel when being confronted, year in and year out, with the intellectual vacuums that come off our high school assembly lines. Semi-literacy is now common in more than 25 percent of composition students, and history instructors tell me that they have reached the point where they now consider the students' frame of reference as zero. . . . Over the past ten years I have conferred with hundreds of freshmen; and, while I have not recorded any data, I think I have a fairly clear idea of what Johnny *does* know, which, in my opinion, merely substantiates the indictment by Sawin and Norman.

Nearly all freshmen are highly informed on the subject of *automobiles*. In this area many of them even have an encyclopedic knowledge, displaying an ability to discourse brilliantly on the functioning of the motor, body style, new gadgets, whether or not fins are aesthetically pleasing, and the burning issue of foreign cars versus American cars. Another intellectual challenge seems to be sports car racing. Many freshmen even go so far as to read all the available literature on this subject, and I would be willing to bet that they know the specialized vocabulary cold, even to the point of spelling all the words correctly.

Most freshmen can talk and write intelligently on the subject of *juvenile delinquency*. They know something about the subtleties of gang warfare and are capable of getting excited about the social factors which breed delinquency. A few of them appear to have done a little reading on the subject.

Another area in which Johnny seems to be intellectually curious is that of *race relations* in the United States. He is vaguely aware of the fact that the Supreme Court handed down a decision that has caused a social upheaval climaxing in Little Rock and he could probably identify the NAACP on an examination.

It is interesting to note that these categories are in the immediate environment of the student and are subjects normally not taught in the high schools. The *immediate* and the *practical*. This is what concerns the American high school student. Of little interest to him are the traditional and the theoretical, on which a good portion of college subject matter is based.

BURLING H. LOWREY
Washington, D. C.

". . . making learning 'fun' "

HAVING taught in the New York City School System for four years, second and third grades, I can testify to the outrageous neglect in the development of a realistic attitude of pleasure toward learning. In the curricula and at conferences supervisors talk in terms of making learning "fun" for the children. . . . To stress that learning is hard work is not only unfashionable but is considered poor pedagogy since all of learning is supposed to be made palatable to *every* child. Not only is learning supposed to be *fun*, but it is only considered valuable if it is for a defined purpose clearly understood by the child. Typical supervisor's questions are: "How is this meaningful to the child?" "What was the child's aim?" That there are some things a child should know for which he cannot yet see a value is not a consideration in a supervisor's criticism of a lesson.

Scholarship or learning as an end in itself is considered "dead weight." If the student doesn't *use* his learning or understand it in terms of *his* own experience, no matter how limited that may be, then there is no value in his learning. This understanding between making something meaningful or understandable as opposed to making something understandable always in terms of the child's own experience has ultimately led to the high school and college student expressing the attitude that anything which is not directly concerned with his own life is meaningless to him and so why should he bother to learn it.

This concept of the teacher as a prime

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What is the

State of the Union?

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And next week . . .

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motivator turns him into a super entertainer. There is only token recognition of the fact that some children will never respond enthusiastically because, for example, they are from culturally starved homes or are simply dull-witted or have emotional barriers, and so on. Nowhere in my experiences have I seen supervision recognize that one teacher with 35 children, with hours of clerical work, cannot reach out to the neurotic, to the non-English speaking child, to the bright child, to the average or dull child, all of whom she finds in her classes, so that each child works at his best level. It is also considered poor pedagogy to teach something just because it is of cultural value and will enhance the child's experiences or environment, *e.g.*, the poems taught usually have a "message"; the songs should likewise have a message, and be from the approved Board list.

Taught to make himself understood with pictures at a time when scrupulously correct verbal and written communication should be developed, he loses his foothold in the very foundations of sound scholarship. Grammar is not taught because a child ostensibly cannot find meaning in a noun, or a verb. Instead he is taught Language Usage, a series of isolated rules of when to use "a" or "an" or "done" or "did." It is thus inconceivable that by high school he will have a thorough grounding in the basic elements of his language

Carried to its logical conclusions, there is no value in Beethoven or in studying Latin. If written communication is to be judged entirely by the criteria of the average high school student, for example, then there surely is no value to studying Shakespeare. How indeed will the student "use" any of the above in a way eminently useable?

Another characteristic of current pedagogical practices which help to prevent a student from being ready for individualized research and scholarship necessary in college lies in the stress on group and adjustment: the social studies program is based on the concept of the committee. Everyone is expected to pitch in and help solve a problem or answer a question. By this research they are supposedly being trained to do individual research for the benefit of the many. It doesn't quite work out that way. Many a child gets lost, doesn't know the problems to be solved, let alone understand why he's supposed to solve them or what a committee is or what his role is within the committee. Somewhere along the line the child loses a feeling of responsibility for his own work. His teacher is always talking about cooperation or help your neighbor and he'll help you but it doesn't quite get across to him that his present behavior or failings or strengths have a lot to do with how he has already behaved and that his present behavior is his future past.

ELAINE BERNARD

New York, N. Y.

► *Quelling Mob No. 3*

SIRS:

IT STRIKES me that there is a paradox involved in this statement by Lillian Smith (*NR*, Dec. 16):

> We must quell Mob No. 3. And we can do it only by showing the people how irrational is their fear of accepting Negroes as citizens.

How do we go about erasing "primitive fears, hatreds, and guilts" (Mob No. 3) by an appeal to reason? If Mob No. 3 comprises man's irrational element, it hardly seems likely that it can be suppressed by logic alone.

Those who advocate exorcism by education assume a far too sanguine view of the capacity for improving human nature. Yes, we can enforce legal equality; and eventually this might even result in a considerable degree of social equality. But can the breeding ground of intolerance, the potential of distrust, the Mob No. 3, ever be totally annihilated?

THOMAS H. REKDAL

Seattle, Washington

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